Harden security, fix rate-limiting, and rename proxy
CI / quality (push) Has been cancelled

- Move admin login lockout from client cookie to AppConfig (DB), keyed
  by hashed client IP — clearing browser cookies no longer bypasses it
- Replace rate-limit $transaction (TOCTOU) with atomic SQL
  INSERT...ON CONFLICT...RETURNING; add stale-entry cleanup on each
  submission to prevent table bloat
- Add 5 s module-level cache for middleware runtime state fetch, reducing
  per-request DB roundtrips
- Rename middleware.ts → proxy.ts to resolve Next.js 16 deprecation
  warning; update test import accordingly
- Require ADMIN_PASSWORD, ADMIN_AUTH_SECRET, ADMIN_BASIC_AUTH_USER, and
  ADMIN_BASIC_AUTH_PASS in docker-compose.yml (:? syntax) — startup
  fails loudly instead of using placeholder defaults
- Add set -e and informative echo lines to Dockerfile CMD for clearer
  startup failure attribution
- Export requireAdminAuth() from lib/admin-auth for centralised use in
  admin pages
- Add CLAUDE.md with architecture notes and working rules

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
MOH
2026-03-17 22:05:50 +01:00
co-authored by Claude Sonnet 4.6
parent b0de1fd66f
commit f490133345
10 changed files with 274 additions and 69 deletions
+102 -36
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,15 @@
import { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from "crypto";
import { cookies } from "next/headers";
import { createHash, createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from "crypto";
import { cookies, headers } from "next/headers";
import { redirect } from "next/navigation";
import { prisma } from "./prisma";
import { getAdminAppPath } from "./admin-routing";
export const ADMIN_SESSION_COOKIE = "moh_admin_session";
const ADMIN_FAIL_COOKIE = "moh_admin_fail";
const ADMIN_SESSION_VALUE = "superadmin";
const MAX_FAILED_ATTEMPTS = 5;
const LOCKOUT_SECONDS = 15 * 60;
const ADMIN_LOCKOUT_KEY_PREFIX = "admin_lockout";
function getSecret(): string {
return process.env.ADMIN_AUTH_SECRET ?? "";
@@ -114,6 +118,35 @@ function verifyToken(token: string): boolean {
return timingSafeEqual(left, right);
}
async function getClientIp(): Promise<string> {
const requestHeaders = await headers();
const forwardedFor = requestHeaders.get("x-forwarded-for");
if (forwardedFor) {
return forwardedFor.split(",")[0]?.trim() ?? "unknown";
}
return requestHeaders.get("x-real-ip")?.trim() ?? "unknown";
}
function getLockoutKey(ip: string): string {
const hash = createHash("sha256").update(ip).digest("hex").slice(0, 16);
return `${ADMIN_LOCKOUT_KEY_PREFIX}:${hash}`;
}
async function cleanupExpiredLockouts(): Promise<void> {
try {
const cutoff = new Date(Date.now() - LOCKOUT_SECONDS * 2 * 1000);
await prisma.$executeRaw`
DELETE FROM "AppConfig"
WHERE key LIKE ${`${ADMIN_LOCKOUT_KEY_PREFIX}:%`}
AND "updatedAt" < ${cutoff}
`;
} catch {
// Non-critical — ignore cleanup errors.
}
}
export function isAdminAuthConfigured(): boolean {
return getPassword().length > 0 && getSecret().length > 0;
}
@@ -180,51 +213,73 @@ function parseFailState(rawValue: string | undefined): FailState {
}
export async function getAdminLockState(): Promise<{ locked: boolean; remainingSeconds: number }> {
const store = await cookies();
const state = parseFailState(store.get(ADMIN_FAIL_COOKIE)?.value);
const now = Date.now();
try {
const ip = await getClientIp();
const key = getLockoutKey(ip);
const config = await prisma.appConfig.findUnique({
where: { key },
select: { value: true },
});
const state = parseFailState(config?.value);
const now = Date.now();
if (state.lockUntil > now) {
return {
locked: true,
remainingSeconds: Math.ceil((state.lockUntil - now) / 1000),
};
if (state.lockUntil > now) {
return {
locked: true,
remainingSeconds: Math.ceil((state.lockUntil - now) / 1000),
};
}
} catch {
// DB unavailable — fail open to avoid blocking the login page.
}
return { locked: false, remainingSeconds: 0 };
}
export async function registerFailedAdminAttempt(): Promise<{ locked: boolean; remainingSeconds: number }> {
const store = await cookies();
const now = Date.now();
const current = parseFailState(store.get(ADMIN_FAIL_COOKIE)?.value);
const attempts = current.lockUntil > now ? current.attempts : current.attempts + 1;
const locked = attempts >= MAX_FAILED_ATTEMPTS;
const lockUntil = locked ? now + LOCKOUT_SECONDS * 1000 : 0;
try {
const ip = await getClientIp();
const key = getLockoutKey(ip);
const now = Date.now();
store.set(ADMIN_FAIL_COOKIE, JSON.stringify({ attempts, lockUntil }), {
httpOnly: true,
sameSite: "lax",
secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === "production",
path: "/",
maxAge: LOCKOUT_SECONDS,
});
await cleanupExpiredLockouts();
return {
locked,
remainingSeconds: locked ? LOCKOUT_SECONDS : 0,
};
const config = await prisma.appConfig.findUnique({
where: { key },
select: { value: true },
});
const current = parseFailState(config?.value);
// If a previous lockout has expired, reset the counter.
const baseAttempts = current.lockUntil > 0 && current.lockUntil < now ? 0 : current.attempts;
const attempts = baseAttempts + 1;
const locked = attempts >= MAX_FAILED_ATTEMPTS;
const lockUntil = locked ? now + LOCKOUT_SECONDS * 1000 : 0;
await prisma.appConfig.upsert({
where: { key },
update: { value: JSON.stringify({ attempts, lockUntil }) },
create: { key, value: JSON.stringify({ attempts, lockUntil }) },
});
return {
locked,
remainingSeconds: locked ? LOCKOUT_SECONDS : 0,
};
} catch {
// DB error — don't lock out so admin can still log in.
return { locked: false, remainingSeconds: 0 };
}
}
export async function resetAdminFailedAttempts(): Promise<void> {
const store = await cookies();
store.set(ADMIN_FAIL_COOKIE, "", {
httpOnly: true,
sameSite: "lax",
secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === "production",
path: "/",
maxAge: 0,
});
try {
const ip = await getClientIp();
const key = getLockoutKey(ip);
await prisma.appConfig.deleteMany({ where: { key } });
} catch {
// Non-critical — ignore.
}
}
export async function isAdminAuthenticated(): Promise<boolean> {
@@ -241,3 +296,14 @@ export async function isAdminAuthenticated(): Promise<boolean> {
return verifyToken(token);
}
/**
* Call at the top of every authenticated admin page or server action.
* Clears the session cookie and redirects to the login page if not authenticated.
*/
export async function requireAdminAuth(): Promise<void> {
if (!(await isAdminAuthenticated())) {
await clearAdminSessionCookie();
redirect(getAdminAppPath("/"));
}
}
+21 -20
View File
@@ -44,28 +44,29 @@ export async function enforceContactRateLimit(settings: ContactProtectionSetting
const ip = await getClientIpFromHeaders();
const key = getRateLimitKey(ip, settings.rateLimit.windowMinutes);
await prisma.$transaction(async (tx) => {
const current = await tx.appConfig.findUnique({
where: { key },
select: { value: true },
});
const nextCount = parseCount(current?.value) + 1;
// Clean up stale rate limit entries (older than 2x the window) to prevent table bloat.
const cutoffDate = new Date(Date.now() - settings.rateLimit.windowMinutes * 2 * 60 * 1000);
await prisma.$executeRaw`
DELETE FROM "AppConfig"
WHERE key LIKE ${`${CONTACT_RATE_LIMIT_KEY_PREFIX}:%`}
AND "updatedAt" < ${cutoffDate}
`;
if (nextCount > settings.rateLimit.maxRequests) {
throw new Error("Too many contact requests. Please try again later.");
}
// Atomically insert or increment the counter for this IP + window.
const result = await prisma.$queryRaw<Array<{ count: number }>>`
INSERT INTO "AppConfig" (id, key, value, "createdAt", "updatedAt")
VALUES (gen_random_uuid()::text, ${key}, '1', NOW(), NOW())
ON CONFLICT (key) DO UPDATE
SET value = (CAST("AppConfig".value AS INTEGER) + 1)::text,
"updatedAt" = NOW()
RETURNING CAST(value AS INTEGER) AS count
`;
await tx.appConfig.upsert({
where: { key },
update: {
value: String(nextCount),
},
create: {
key,
value: "1",
},
});
});
const count = result[0]?.count ?? 0;
if (count > settings.rateLimit.maxRequests) {
throw new Error("Too many contact requests. Please try again later.");
}
}
export async function verifyTurnstileToken(